Interview Protocols

U.S. Congress

1. We want to understand how you and your organization approach congressional engagement over the last two years, including both who you have sought to engage with, and how you have sought to engage with them.
   a. Who: What considerations drive decisions about which members of Congress or congressional staff you seek to engage with? (e.g., targeting established nuclear advocates vs. MOCs known to or believed to have less capacity / interest to engage with nuclear issues)?
   b. Which members of Congress or congressional staff have you sought to engage?
      i. Do you target people in the Senate and the House? Both republicans and democrats? New vs. old members?
   c. In your efforts, to what extent do you aim for “breadth” - i.e., interacting with many MOCs in one-off engagements, “depth” – i.e., building a smaller number of strong, long-lasting relationships with experienced and influential MOCs, or a balance of “breadth” and “depth”?

2. How: We understand that some of your congressional engagement efforts focus on educating members of Congress related to nuclear and other issues.
   a. What are the principle mechanisms you use to educate MOCs or staff?
      i. E.g. meetings, briefing, on-pagers, convenings
   b. What considerations drive your decisions about what topics to address with policy makers?
      i. Probe: Do you seek to be responsive based on the current policy environment? Aim to raise/discuss particular ideas or solutions? Both? Other?
   c. Do you engage around multiple topics (e.g. Iran, N. Korea, terrorism)? Or primarily around a single topic?

3. Are any issues/topics top of mind for staffers/MOCs you work with? Are there certain issues/topics around which it is more difficult to generate interest?

4. Do you coordinate or collaborate with other organizations in your efforts to engage with MOCs?
a. If yes, why? And what has resulted from coordination/collaboration with other organizations on congressional engagement?

b. If no, why not?

5. Beyond what we have already discussed, are there other ways in which you seek to influence progress on nuclear issues within Congress?

6. As you’ve sought to engage with MOCs and staff, what were expectations of what could be achieved? How do you envision being influential?
   a. How have MOCs and staff responded to their engagement with you?
   b. To what extent have key parties been receptive to information and ideas shared?
   c. In your view, to what extent have MOCs and staff gained or deepened their awareness or perspectives as a result of the information you shared with them?

7. As you reflect on the past ~3 years, what are signals that engagement by you/ other non-governmental experts have been persuasive or influential for MOCs and congressional staff?
   a. Have you heard MOCs and congressional staff confirm the credibility or value of information or recommendations that [you/non-governmental organizations] have shared? [Probe for specifics]
   b. Have MOCs and congressional staff increased their awareness and knowledge of nuclear issues you care about?
   c. Have MOCs and congressional staff become more supportive of the information or ideas [you/non-governmental organizations] endorse? [Probe for specifics]
   d. To the best of your knowledge, to what extent has the information or ideas that you’ve shared guided MOCs and congressional staff thinking, decisions, or actions? [Probe for specifics]
      i. Do you have evidence that ideas/information been taken up within specific legislative policy proposals?

8. As you reflect on the past ~3 years:
   a. Have there been/what are signals of progress advancement of policy goals related to nuclear issues within congress? [Probe for specifics, e.g., increased engagement/capacity, improved dialog; increase support for specific policies; positive the actions, statements, or behaviors of MOCS; increased credibility/uptake of certain ideas or proposed solutions]
      i. [For any signals of progress named, probe to learn: when did it occur? What contributed (probe for specifics)?]
   b. Have there been/what are setbacks? [Probe for specifics, e.g., deteriorating bipartisan relationships; negative or damaging actions, statements; crowding out by other issues]
i. [For any setback named, probe to learn: when did it occur? What contributed (probe for specifics)?]

9. We want to acknowledge that positive change does not always mean progress toward non-proliferation or disarmament (e.g. a major treaty being ratified). Particularly in the current congressional context, preventing bad decisions from being made, or maintaining/defending the status quo (e.g. continued US-Russia engagement on nuclear issues) would also represent positive change. As you reflect on the last three years,

a. Have there been/what are examples of poor congressional decisions or actions that were prevented, or mitigated?
   i. [For any examples identified, probe to learn: when did it occur? What contributed (probe for specifics)?]

b. Have there been/what are examples of congressional actions that have been taken to defend the status quo around nuclear issues (e.g. the JCPOA, INF treaty)?
   i. [For any examples named, probe to learn: when did it occur? What contributed (probe for specifics)?]

10. What are the current dynamics that influence the effectiveness or influence of efforts to engage with MOCs and congressional staff on nuclear issues?

a. Probe for: Increased partisanship/polarization, turnover in congress (i.e. new members coming in), executive branch shaping debate, other issues crowding out nuclear

b. To what extent do the dynamics you identify represent a departure from previous eras or iterations of congress?

11. To what extent is public opinion a factor that affects congressional attitudes toward nuclear issues? If public opinion around nuclear issues were to shift, would that impact your ability to be effective in your congressional engagement efforts? Why/why not?

12. To what extent do you track the your personal/organizational engagement with member of Congress or congressional staff?
   i. Would you be able to provide us a list?
U.S. Congress – Nuclear Security Working Group Fellows (NWSG)

1. Can you briefly describe how you came to work in the office of [Name of representative].
   a. What motivated the office of [Name of representative] to host an NWSG fellow in their office?

2. Can you briefly describe your role as a fellow in [Name of representative]’s office?
   a. How long have you been a fellow in the office of [Name of representative]?

3. How would you describe [Name of representative]’s depth of engagement in nuclear issues?
   a. Probe: How interested or engaged is he/she in nuclear issues? How long has he/she been engaged? What motivated him/her to become engaged?
   b. Has [Name of representative]’s engagement on these issues changed over time?

4. We understand that part of your role as a fellow is to brief/advise [Name of representative] on nuclear policy. How do you hope your position as a fellow provides value or achieves beneficial influence?
   a. Do you also brief/advise others? If so, whom?
   b. What are the ways that you provide information advice to [Name of representative] or others?
      i. Do you brief MOC(s) directly? Brief their other staff?
      ii. How do you share information – e.g., verbally in meetings or via briefs or other written materials?
   c. What are some of the topics you have addressed with [Name of representative] / other staff / others?
      i. What considerations drive your decisions on what topics to address?
         [Probe: do you respond to MOCs’ requests? Aim to be responsive based on the current policy environment? Aim to raise/discuss particular ideas or solutions? Both? Other?] 

5. As you have shared information, how have [Name of representative] / other staff /others responded? [We are interested in information sharing within the office where the fellow has been placed, as well as with others they have shared information with]
   a. To what extent has [Name of representative] / their staff / others reacted favorably to information and ideas you have shared?
      i. Have they been more interested in certain topics as compared to others?

6. As you reflect on your time working in the office of [Name of representative], to what extent have you seen signals that they have deepened their engagement on nuclear issues?
a. Probe for: Increase awareness/knowledge, supportive statement, introducing legislation, co-sponsoring legislation, casting beneficial votes.

7. Have there been/what are (even subtle) signals of progress advancement of policy goals related to nuclear issues within congress? [Probe for specifics, e.g., increased engagement/capacity, improved dialog; increase support for specific policies; positive the actions, statements, or behaviors of MOCS; increased credibility/uptake of certain ideas or proposed solutions]
   i. [For any signals of progress named, probe to learn: when did it occur? What contributed (probe for specifics)?]

b. Have there been/what are challenges? [Probe for specifics, e.g., deteriorating bipartisan relationships; negative or damaging actions, statements; crowding out by other issues]
   i. [For any setback named, probe to learn: when did it occur? What contributed (probe for specifics)?]

8. [For those that attended “The Bomb”] We know you attended the Bomb when it was screened at the National Academy of Sciences in May. To what extent is this type of event a good mechanism for engaging and generating interest among members of congress around nuclear issues?

9. Thinking about the broader congressional landscape, what is your perception of the prominence of nuclear issues in the minds of MOCS and congressional staff?
   a. Are any nuclear issues top of mind? Are certain issues more difficult to engage on?
   b. Have the issues become more prominent since you began your work in this office? Do the issues wax and wane?
   c. Are there things that could be done to increase the prominence of nuclear issues on the policy agenda?
   d. To what extent is public opinion a factor in representatives and staffs thinking and perception of nuclear issues?

10. What is your perception of demand for nuclear policy advice/information among members of congress?
    a. Is there interest beyond CNWSG [Congressional Nuclear Security Working Group]? Among who/which members?

11. Thinking about MOCs more broadly beyond the member you work with, what drives MOC decision-making on nuclear issues? (i.e. are they driven by fundamentals/values, or political/strategic concerns, a combination?)
1. What issues in relation to U.S.-Russia nuclear relations, in what formats, were you working on pre-2015?
   a. What were you looking to achieve and what were the outcomes during this period (pre-2015)?
   b. If you were working on Track 1.5 or Track 2 dialogue, who / what types of organizations were you engaging, including if you were you engaging with any governmental actors? (understanding it might be sensitive to name individuals)

2. Were you coordinating with others in the field during this time?

3. We want to understand if, and how, some key events from the past decade (prior to 2015) affected U.S. Russia relations, in particular the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the stepped up Russian military presence along the Ukraine border, and the conflict with Russia-backed separatists in Ukraine.
   a. How did these events impact the direction of your work, if at all? And how do you see these as having influenced U.S.-Russia relations, esp during the Obama era, and specifically the nuclear dialogue?

4. In addition to the changing context and increasing tensions, were there other key issues or events that shaped the U.S.-Russia nuclear dialogue during this period?
   a. How did that impact the outcomes of the work you were doing?

5. What role was the MacArthur Foundation playing in supporting NGOs and/or different ways of addressing U.S.-Russia nuclear dialogue during this time?

6. What U.S.-Russia nuclear relations issues have you been working on since 2015?
   a. Who or what entities, including government, have you aimed to influence? In what ways?
   b. What has been your strategy in deciding what to share / what to influence? [Probe as to whether focus was specifically on a U.S. audience and specific targets within this, or a broader audience, including Russian government, and academic/defense/scientific communities]
   c. What were the reactions of those who were briefed / who you shared information with?
   d. To what extent do you feel that your efforts to influence officials have been effective or not effective?
i. What did you see, hear, or read that helped you understand whether your efforts were effective/not effective? [probe for policy, collaboration, increasing openness to exchanges or dialogue]

e. To what extent have you coordinated your work with others in the field? [Probe for details, including why or why not]

7. Have there been significant shifts in opportunities to work on U.S.-Russia nuclear relations since the Trump administration, i.e., since 2016? If yes, what has shaped this?

8. There have been a range of decisions, primarily made by the US administration since 2016 in relation to US-Russia nuclear relations – what do you see as the implications for...
   a. U.S. withdrawal from the INF treaty (recognizing the prior lack of regard for it on the part of Russia)?
   b. Potential U.S. withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty?
   c. Growing uncertainty regarding the renewal of New START?

9. There have also been a set of broader diplomatic tensions since 2016 including accusations of meddling in the 2016 elections, and ongoing challenges in relation to Syria. To what extent have some of these broader tensions impacted the nuclear dialogue, if at all?
   a. Have you been working on these issues specifically? Who have you sought to influence?
   b. What was your strategy in deciding what to share / whom to influence (US and broader)?
   c. How did you decide what information or analysis to share in order to influence [those named]?
   d. What were the reactions of those who were briefed / who you shared information with?
   e. To what extent do you feel that your efforts to influence officials have been effective?
      i. What did you see, hear, or read that helped you understand whether your efforts were effective/not effective? [probe for policy, collaboration, increasing openness to exchanges or dialogue]

10. What level of access have you had to policymakers focusing on U.S.-Russia, both in the U.S. and in Russia (and where relevant, elsewhere)?
   a. Has access to policy / decision-makers changed at all over time?

11. What role was the MacArthur Foundation playing in supporting NGOs and/or different ways of working during this time?

12. Over the past decade, what have been the points of success in.. [influencing policy, encouraging greater collaboration, establishing or enhancing communication or dialogue] regarding your work on U.S.-Russia relations? Equally, where have you experienced setbacks or not gained traction?
13. What do you consider might happen if dialogue re New START falls apart? Are you developing or planning for any work that would support contingencies in this area? [probe to understand differing scenarios on the progression of a dialogue / or lack of it re New Start, and the implications]
   a. Related to this, what are your thoughts about whether and when the U.S. and Russia might be in a new arms race? Do you have a view of how this would be best assessed and measured?
   b. Equally, what might signal progress?

14. Do you see coordination on issues related to U.S.-Russia among the non-governmental community, including in developing positions around New START, and threats of a new arms race?

15. To what extent is the donor community coordinated in their investments re U.S.-Russia nuclear relations?

16. How, if at all, are you / your organization thinking about how to engage on issues related to U.S.-Russia after the U.S. 2020 elections?
   a. Do you have a strategy for a way forward if there is a Trump re-election
   b. Do you have a strategy for a way forward if there is a democratic win?
   c. If so, can you share your approach on how you are planning for it?

17. Has public opinion been a factor in the U.S.-Russia dialogue? [Probe for how public opinion might or might not be a factor]

18. Are there any gaps in expertise or issues that are not being covered at present in relation to U.S.-Russia nuclear relations which might be valuable?

19. In order to help us better understand issues at play, can you recommend any reports, briefs, or other secondary sources that you think would be useful?

Non-Grantees

1. We want to understand if, and how, some key events from the past decade (prior to 2015) affected U.S. Russia relations, in particular the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the stepped up Russian military presence along the Ukraine border, and the conflict with Russia-backed separatists in Ukraine.
   a. How did these events impact the direction of your work, if at all? And how do you see these as having influenced U.S.-Russia relations, especially during the Obama era, and specifically the nuclear dialogue?

2. In addition to the changing context and increasing tensions, were there other key issues or events that shaped the U.S.-Russia nuclear dialogue during this period?
   a. How did that impact the outcomes of the work you were doing?
3. What role was the MacArthur Foundation playing in supporting NGOs and/or different ways of addressing U.S.-Russia nuclear dialogue during this time?

4. Have there been significant shifts in opportunities to work on U.S.-Russia nuclear relations since the Trump administration, i.e., since 2016? If yes, what has shaped this?

5. There have been a range of decisions, primarily made by the US administration since 2016 in relation to US-Russia nuclear relations — what do you see as the implications for...
   a. U.S. withdrawal from the INF treaty (recognizing the prior lack of regard for it on the part of Russia)?
   b. Potential U.S. withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty?
   c. Growing uncertainty regarding the renewal of New START?

6. There have also been a set of broader diplomatic tensions since 2016 including accusations of meddling in the 2016 elections, and ongoing challenges in relation to Syria. To what extent have some of these broader tensions impacted the nuclear dialogue, if at all?
   a. Have you been working on these issues specifically? Who have you sought to influence?
   b. What was your strategy in deciding what to share / whom to influence (US and broader)?
   c. How did you decide what information or analysis to share in order to influence [those named]?
   d. What were the reactions of those who were briefed / who you shared information with?
   e. To what extent do you feel that your efforts to influence officials have been effective?
      i. What did you see, hear, or read that helped you understand whether your efforts were effective/not effective? [probe for policy, collaboration, increasing openness to exchanges or dialogue]

7. What level of access have you had to policy-makers focusing on U.S.-Russia, both in the U.S. and in Russia (and where relevant, elsewhere)?
   a. Has access to policy / decision-makers changed at all over time?

8. What role was the MacArthur Foundation playing in supporting NGOs and/or different ways of working during this time?

9. Over the past decade, what have been the points of success in... [influencing policy, encouraging greater collaboration, establishing or enhancing communication or dialogue] regarding your work on U.S.-Russia relations? Equally, where have you experienced setbacks or not gained traction?

10. What do you consider might happen if dialogue re New START falls apart? Are you developing or planning for any work that would support contingencies in this area? [probe to understand differing scenarios on the progression of a dialogue / or lack of it re New Start, and the implications]
a. Related to this, what are your thoughts about whether and when the U.S. and Russia might be in a new arms race? Do you have a view of how this would be best assessed and measured?
b. Equally, what might signal progress?

11. Do you see coordination on issues related to U.S.-Russia among the non-governmental community, including in developing positions around New START, and threats of a new arms race?

12. To what extent is the donor community coordinated in their investments re U.S.-Russia nuclear relations?

13. How, if at all, are you / your organization thinking about how to engage on issues related to U.S.-Russia after the U.S. 2020 elections?
   a. Do you have a strategy for a way forward if there is a Trump re-election
   b. Do you have a strategy for a way forward if there is a democratic win?
   c. If so, can you share your approach on how you are planning for it?

14. Has public opinion been a factor in the U.S.-Russia dialogue? [Probe for how public opinion might or might not be a factor]

15. Are there any gaps in expertise or issues that are not being covered at present in relation to U.S.-Russia nuclear relations which might be valuable?

16. In order to help us better understand issues at play, can you recommend any reports, briefs, or other secondary sources that you think would be useful?
**Possessor/Non-Possessor**

1. As noted, one area of focus for the MacArthur Foundation is addressing tensions between nuclear weapons possessor and non possessor countries. Can you tell me about your work in this area?

2. To what extent is there / has there been good faith participation and/or productive dialogue between possessors and non-possessors? E.g., at / around PrepCom or in other venues?

   Things to listen for and explore as they come up [tell me more about that; what were the specifics on that; why was this important; how did that happen?]:

   - Delayed announcement of Grossi as president for the 2020 NPT Review Conference (RevCon). To what extent is this delay likely to affect the productivity or success of the RevCon? To what extent does the delay reflect tensions between Ps/NPs, and/or something else?

   - Tensions between Russia and the U.S., as well as other P5 nations (e.g., U.K.). To the extent these are present and significant, to what extent are these tensions affecting dialogue or consensus-building?

   - Ban Treaty. To what extent is the Ban treaty at the margins of dialogue versus a significant dividing issue? To what extent is the Ban Treaty a positive or negative influence with regard to P/NP dialogue and diplomacy?

   - Middle East WMD-free zone. To what extent is this issue a positive or negative influence with regard to P/NP dialogue and diplomacy?

   - Perceptions re: US leadership and/or the credibility of the CEND initiative (Creating an Environment for Nuclear Diplomacy). To what extent are these factors a positive or negative influence with regard to P/NP dialogue and diplomacy?

3. How have you seen participation in dialogue and/or the quality of dialogue between possessors and non-possessors change or evolve over the past three years – specifically, what have been signals of more/less: good faith participation, the productivity of dialogue, common ground?

4. To what extent is there a clear framework and agenda for the NPT review conference? [Probe for specifics: Tell me more about that; what were the specifics on that; how did that happen?]

   a. Are there common ground ideas or recommendations that have credibility with and/or support from both Ps and NPs?

   b. Are there / what are sticking points or barriers that stand in the way of dialogue, consensus, or agreement between possessors and non-possessors?

5. How do you see non-governmental organizations playing a role in facilitating productive dialogue and progress toward consensus between possessor and non-possessor representatives?

   a. What’s your sense about what NGOs are / aren’t able to do in terms of facilitating productive dialogue?
b. How have NGOs influenced or created opportunities for productive dialogue – e.g., at PrepCom or in other venues?
   i. If so, describe how NGOs were influential – specific NGOs? Specific approaches?
   ii. If not, what do you think is preventing NGOs’ influence?

c. Is there collaboration among NGOs, or is this even an aim? Why / why not?

6. Post PrepCom, have there been any recent statements from possessor or non-possessor country representatives coming that provide a glimpse into the status of productive dialogue or consensus between those countries?

   a. Note: probe for the following if response is yes.
      i. What statements were offered?
      ii. Which countries / who made the statements?
      iii. Are / where are the statements published?

7. Reflecting on the status of possessor / non-possessor dialogue and consensus, do you have other observations or perceptions to share?
Iran

Grantees (for those working on Iran during January 2013 thru September 2013):

1. Were you working on research/analysis related to Iran’s nuclear activity during this period?
   a. If so, what was the purpose of your research?
   b. Who was the audience for your work?

2. Do you recall any ways in which your research and analysis was utilized in relation to policy/decision-making/preparation for either of these dialogues (EU and U.S.-led) with Iran?

Grantee and others:

3. Can you share when you became aware of the secret negotiations between the U.S. and Iran?

4. After the announcement of the JPOA in late 2013, what were the responses by NGOs in the field? To what extent were there clear opportunities for NGOs to convene discussions or develop research/analysis regarding Iran’s nuclear activity; or other issues related to security and Iran?
   a. If so, how did this occur – when, where and with whom?
   b. What issues were you focused on at this time?
   c. What were the reactions of those who were briefed / who you shared information with?
   d. To what extent do you feel that your efforts to influence officials were effective? What did you see, hear, or read that helped you understand whether your efforts were effective/not effective?

5. Leading up to the JCPOA, we understand that the field was beginning to organize itself in new / different ways, e.g., the Iran Listserv, coordinating its work with Ploughshares acting as a hub. Can you describe how this way of working may have been different than in the past?
   a. How/to what extent was this way of working beneficial regarding opportunities to influence the dialogue between the P5+1 and Iran?
   b. Have there been any unintended consequences or challenges regarding this type of coordinated approach?

6. What role was the MacArthur Foundation playing in supporting NGOs and/or different ways of working during this time?

Grantees:

7. Over this period was there research / analysis you were working on which related, directly or indirectly, to the JCPOA agreement or to issues of security and Iran more broadly?
   a. If so, what were your areas of focus?
b. Who were you aiming to influence? In what ways?

c. What was your strategy in deciding what to share / what to influence? [Probe as to whether focus was specifically on a U.S. audience and specific targets within this, or a broader audience, including other parties to the JCPOA]

d. What were the reactions of those who were briefed / who you shared information with?

e. To what extent do you feel that your efforts to influence officials were effective? What did you see, hear, or read that helped you understand whether your efforts were effective/not effective?

Grantee and others:

8. If your role involved analysis of the implementation of the JCPOA, what was your assessment of the agreement during this period, including the trade-offs inherent within it?
   a. To what extent were the parties acting in support of the agreement and upholding their commitments?
   b. What were the hoped-for outcomes over this period?
   c. What were the challenges?

9. Following the change in the U.S. administration in Jan 2017, there was also a change in U.S. policy towards the JCPOA. What do you understand to be the drivers for this shift in approach from 2017 onwards? [Probe – broader concerns of the U.S. administration re: Iran in the Middle East, ballistic missile production, pressure from Israel, general antipathy to multilateralism; JCPOA perceived as an Obama relic, other?]
   a. Grantees: Was there research / analysis you were working on which directly or indirectly addressed the growing concerns that the U.S. Administration would withdraw from the JCPOA?
      i. If so, how did this occur – when, where and with whom etc?
      ii. What was your strategy in deciding what to share / what to influence including U.S. specific targets or a broader audience, including other parties to the JCPOA?
      iii. What were the reactions of those who were briefed / who you shared information with?
      iv. To what extent do you feel that your efforts to influence officials were effective? What did you see, hear, or read that helped you understand whether your efforts were effective/not effective?
Grantee and others:

10. What role was the MacArthur Foundation playing in supporting NGOs and/or different ways of working during this time?

Grantees:

11. Reflecting back over the entire time period, what level of access have you had to policy-makers in working on Iran and its commitment to non-proliferation, both in the U.S. and Iran (and where relevant, elsewhere)?
   a. Has access to policy / decision-makers changed at all over time?
   b. Can you provide examples of the types of people you’ve had the opportunity to brief / present your work to?

Grantees and others:

12. Reflecting back over the entire time period – 2013 to date -
   a. What were the points of success regarding engaging Iran and its commitment to nonproliferation?
   b. What might signal progress going forward?

13. Based on your analysis, what approach is Iran taking today regarding 1) the JCPOA and 2) its diplomatic relations with the U.S.? [Probe noting that Iran's initial strategy appeared to be to remain in a weakened Iran Deal until U.S. politics shifted in the Deal’s favor, but this seems to be changing – do KI’s agree]

14. How would you characterize current multilateral approaches towards nonproliferation in Iran, including that of the Joint Commission? [Probe – for role of P5+1 - recognizing the limited role of the U.S. - and E3, the Joint Commission/role of INSTEX, other parties where relevant]

15. How, if at all, are you / your organization thinking about how to engage on issues related to Iran after the U.S. 2020 elections?
   a. Do you have a strategy for a way forward if there is a Trump re-election and / or a democratic win?
   b. If so, can you share any ideas on how you will approach it?

16. Has public opinion been a factor in the U.S.-Iran dialogue? [Probe for how public opinion might or might not be a factor]

17. Are there any gaps in expertise or issues that are not being covered at present in relation to Iran and its commitment to nonproliferation?

18. In order to help us better understand issues related to Iran and nonproliferation can you recommend any reports, briefs, or other secondary sources that you think would be useful?
North Korea

Lead

1. We want to explore how you [Stanford / CEIP] shared analysis and recommendations with Steve Biegun and other key parties in advance of the recent US-North Korea summit in Vietnam.
   a. How did you become involved in providing advice on the summit?
      i. Who engaged you [Stanford / CEIP] to provide information on the summit? What was the ask?
      ii. How much time did you [Stanford / CEIP] spend on this work?
   b. With whom did you share your insights, analysis, and recommendations in advance of the summit?
      i. Besides Steve Biegun, who else did you hope to (or aim to) brief ahead of the summit?
      ii. (If prompt needed) Are there key parties outside of government that you shared information with [e.g., David Ignatius]? Or wanted to share information with? And for what purpose?
   c. Generally, what kind of information did you share with Steve Biegun – for example, background information about activities at North Korean facilities, underlying motivations, specific recommendations – and what did you hope to accomplish by sharing that information? [No need to ask interviewees to share specifics]
   d. What were key considerations in determining what information to present to the key parties who were preparing for the summit?
      i. How did you envision your analysis and recommendations would be perceived by members of the Trump administration and other parties?
   e. What were reactions from those that were briefed/received information?
      i. How did parties respond to the analysis and recommendations or find them compelling?

2. We also want to explore the results of your engagement with Steve Biegun and others involved in the summit from the U.S. side.
   f. As you shared analysis and recommendations with the key parties, what were your expectations of what could be achieved? To what extent were those results achieved?
   g. I know Steve Biegun referenced your analysis and recommendations; to what extent did he (and others) echo and endorse these?
   h. To the best of your knowledge, to what extent did your analysis and recommendation guide the summit discussion?
   i. Was anything surprising or disappointing?
3. Following this event, what are your perceptions the status of US-North Korea dialogue regarding nuclear issues?
   
j. Is there anything you can share regarding what you understand happened at the summit?
   
k. What have you seen that makes you optimistic about future productive dialogue?
   
l. What have you seen that makes you worried?
      
i. (If they respond to 3c) What does that mean for future progress?
   
m. Do you [Stanford / CEIP] remain engaged with Steve Biegun or others?
   
n. What would facilitate more or more productive dialogue between the US and North Korea?
   
o. What would be future positive/negative signals about US-North Korea dialogue?

4. You’ve been involved in this work for some time. What is your perception on how preparations and advising for the recent summit were different than past similar experiences?
   
p. For example, under previous presidential administrations, would your efforts to engage with key parties, or efforts to convey information to key parties, have looked different in any way? How?
   
q. How would you see it looking different in the future?
   
r. Would your expectations regarding the outcomes of the summit have been different?

Key Informant

1. One of the MacArthur Foundation’s aims is to promote ongoing positive, productive dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea and support incremental steps towards North Korea’s denuclearization. For grantees: How has the MacArthur Foundation supported your work in this area?

2. How/when/to what extent do you brief decisionmakers re: your research/analysis/recommendations?
   
a. [Probe for details about which decisionmakers are viewed as most strategic to engage with, and how interviewees connect with them – e.g., via their own contacts and relationships, at the request of officials, etc.]
   
b. [Probe for the kinds of materials and level of detail that are shared with decisionmakers, and the kinds of forums where sharing happens]?

3. When you brief decisionmakers regarding your [research, analysis, recommendations], what are key considerations for how best to persuade or influence their thinking and decisions?
   
a. Do you tailor the information and ideas that you share, or your overall approach when you engage different officials? If yes, how so?
b. Are the efforts by non-gov orgs to share analysis/recommendations with officials intentionally coordinated? Why/why not?

4. For grantees: As you’ve shared information and ideas or sought to engage with key parties, what were expectations of what could be achieved? How do you envision that your ideas would be perceived by decisionmakers/officials?
   a. How have key parties responded?
   b. To what extent have key parties been receptive to information and ideas shared?
   c. In your view, to what extent have key parties gained or deepened their awareness or perspectives as a result of being briefed?

5. As you reflect on the past ~3 years, what are signals that information and analysis about U.S.-North Korea nuclear issues provided by non-governmental experts has been persuasive or influential for decisionmakers/officials?
   a. Have you heard decisionmakers confirm the credibility or value of information or recommendations that [you/non-governmental organizations] have shared? [Probe for specifics]
   b. Have you heard decisionmakers reference, echo, or endorse information or ideas shared by [you/non-governmental organizations]? [Probe for specifics]
   c. To the best of your knowledge, to what extent has the information or ideas that you’ve shared guided officials’ thinking, decisions, or actions? [Probe for specifics]
   d. Do you have evidence that ideas/information been taken up in negotiations? That it has become part of U.S. policy?

6. As you reflect on the past ~3 years,
   a. Have there been/what are signals of progress regarding U.S.-North Korea nuclear diplomacy? [Probe for specifics, e.g., improved bi-lateral/multi-lateral relationships; the actions, statements, or behaviors of leaders in one or both countries; increased credibility/uptake of certain ideas or proposed solutions]
      i. [For any signals of progress named, probe to learn: when did it occur? What contributed (probe for specifics)?]
   b. Have there been/what are setbacks? [Probe for specifics, e.g., deteriorating bi-lateral/multi-lateral relationships; negative or damaging actions, statements, or behaviors by leaders in one or both countries; escalating non-nuclear tensions; domestic/global landscape factors]
      i. [For any setback named, probe to learn: when did it occur? What contributed (probe for specifics)?]

7. In the wake of the March 2019 summit in Hanoi, what are your perceptions about the status of U.S.-North Korea nuclear diplomacy?
a. To what extent are you optimistic about future productive dialogue? [Probe for what are reasons for optimism]

b. To what extent are you worried? [Probe for causes for concern]

c. What would facilitate future productive dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea?

d. What could impede dialogue?

8. To what extent is public opinion a factor that could affect dialogue? E.g., some have noted that negative public opinions about the Trump administration and Kim/North Korea could affect dialogue. Do you agree? Why/why not?

9. You’ve been involved in this work for some time. Are/how are [your/non-governmental orgs’] efforts to engage with governmental officials different now than in the past? For example, under previous U.S. presidential administrations, would experts’ efforts to share information or ideas have looked different in any way? How so?

   a. How would you see this looking different in the future?

10. In order to help us better understand U.S.-North Korea nuclear diplomacy, North Korea’s behaviors, actions, and decisions vis-à-vis the nuclear regime, and signals of progress and stalls can you recommend reports, briefs, or other secondary sources that you think would be useful?
1. We understand that there are differences between nuclear possessors, non-possessors who are allied with possessors, and other non-possessors regarding their support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (also known as the ban treaty), that could have implications for the NPT. What is the current state of dialogue between Ps and NPs?
   a. Are there certain issues/topics around which it is easier or more difficult to find consensus?
   b. What are key differences or sticking points?
   c. How have differences manifested/grown in the recent past? [Probe for specific examples]
   d. How might these differences/sticking points come in to play at PrepCom?

2. How are you and/or other non-governmental organizations approaching or responding to differences or tensions between Ps and NPs around the NPT?
   a. Probe for the role(s) that non-gov orgs play, e.g., sharing information, analysis or recommendations to prepare, facilitate, encourage, or support key parties to come to the table.

3. Are there particular ideas or recommendations related to nuclear policy that seem to have credibility with and/or support from both Ps and NPs?

4. As PrepCom approaches, to what extent are non-governmental organizations responding to differences/tensions between possessors and non-possessors and encouraging collaboration?
   a. What do you see as strong openings or opportunities for non-governmental organizations to foster collaboration between possessors and non-possessors?
   b. In your view, what would be positive signals or signs of progress?
   c. We’ve learned that Austria, Mexico, Ireland, and New Zealand are key NPs. What would be positive signals related to these countries’ participation and engagement in PrepCom or related discussions?
   d. What about positive signals from the P5?

5. What do you see as challenging factors that could limit openings or opportunities at PrepCom, e.g., key parties (Austria, Mexico, Ireland, New Zealand, US, Russia) won’t be present, differences or tensions between countries on other issues besides nuclear, inflammatory rhetoric or polarization?
   a. In your view, what would be disappointments or worries coming out of PrepCom?
6. Some have suggested that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (also known as the ban treaty) presents an important opportunity to inject new energy into disarmament diplomacy. Would you agree that the ban treaty is an opportunity? If so, why?
   a. If not, how might the ban treaty negatively affect diplomacy, and specifically tensions between possessors and non-possessors?

7. Anything else to add?

Key Informants

1. As noted, one area of focus for the MacArthur Foundation is addressing tensions between nuclear weapons possessor and non-possessor countries. Can you tell me about your work in this area?
2. To what extent is there / has there been good faith participation and/or productive dialogue between possessors and non-possessors? E.g., at / around PrepCom or in other venues?

   Things to listen for and explore as they come up [tell me more about that; what were the specifics on that; why was this important; how did that happen?]:
   
   o Delayed announcement of Grossi as president for the 2020 NPT Review Conference (RevCon). To what extent is this delay likely to affect the productivity or success of the RevCon? To what extent does the delay reflect tensions between Ps/NPs, and/or something else?
   
   o Tensions between Russia and the U.S., as well as other P5 nations (e.g., U.K.). To the extent these are present and significant, to what extent are these tensions affecting dialogue or consensus-building?
   
   o Ban Treaty. To what extent is the Ban treaty at the margins of dialogue versus a significant dividing issue? To what extent is the Ban Treaty a positive or negative influence with regard to P/NP dialogue and diplomacy?
   
   o Middle East WMD-free zone. To what extent is this issue a positive or negative influence with regard to P/NP dialogue and diplomacy?
   
   o Perceptions re: US leadership and/or the credibility of the CEND initiative (Creating an Environment for Nuclear Diplomacy). To what extent are these factors a positive or negative influence with regard to P/NP dialogue and diplomacy?

3. How have you seen participation in dialogue and/or the quality of dialogue between possessors and non-possessors change or evolve over the past three years – specifically, what have been signals of more/less: good faith participation, the productivity of dialogue, common ground?

4. To what extent is there a clear framework and agenda for the NPT review conference? [Probe for specifics: Tell me more about that; what were the specifics on that; how did that happen?]
a. Are there common ground ideas or recommendations that have credibility with and/or support from both Ps and NPs?

b. Are there what are sticking points or barriers that stand in the way of dialogue, consensus, or agreement between possessors and non-possessors?

5. How do you see non-governmental organizations playing a role in facilitating productive dialogue and progress toward consensus between possessor and non-possessor representatives?

a. What’s your sense about what NGOs are aren’t able to do in terms of facilitating productive dialogue?

b. How have NGOs influenced or created opportunities for productive dialogue – e.g., at PrepCom or in other venues?
   i. If so, describe how NGOs were influential – specific NGOs? Specific approaches?
   ii. If not, what do you think is preventing NGOs’ influence?

c. Is there collaboration among NGOs, or is this even an aim? Why why not?

6. Post PrepCom, have there been any recent statements from possessor or non-possessor country representatives coming that provide a glimpse into the status of productive dialogue or consensus between those countries?

a. Note: probe for the following if response is yes.
   iii. What statements were offered?
   iv. Which countries who made the statements?
   v. Are / where are the statements published?

7. Reflecting on the status of possessor non-possessor dialogue and consensus, do you have other observations or perceptions to share?
Global Fuel Cycle

1. We understand that you work on issues related to the nuclear fuel cycle in support of the MacArthur foundation’s goal to reduce nuclear risk (e.g., globally, in Japan and South Korea, in the US, and in Europe). Why is it important to make promote action and improved policy to address the nuclear fuel cycle at this moment?
   a. In the current environment, what are major opportunities related to the nuclear fuel cycle and promoting nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful use?
   b. Who are the key actors that have the power/standing/position to influence fuel cycle issues?
   c. What are the major challenges and sticking points? E.g., complexities of governance by both domestic and international bodies?

2. How has the MacArthur Foundation supported your work on fuel cycle issues at the global, regional and country levels? [We can take these one by one]

3. How/when/to what extent do you share your research and analysis with decision makers or other key parties?
   a. With whom/which decisions makers do you share or engage?

4. Beyond sharing research and analysis, what are other ways in which your work might be influential toward the Foundation’s aims?

5. As you’ve shared information and ideas or sought to engage with key parties around fuel cycle issues, what were expectations of what could be achieved? How do you envision that your ideas would be perceived by decisionmakers/officials?
   a. How have key parties responded?
   b. To what extent have key parties been receptive to information and ideas shared?
   c. In your view, to what extent have key parties gained or deepened their awareness or perspectives as a result of being briefed?

6. [For each areas of the fuel cycle you are working on] As you reflect on the past ~3 years,
   a. Have there been/what are signals of progress regarding country level, regional, or global fuel cycle efforts? [Probe for specifics, e.g., traction on specific policy solutions, improved bi- or multi-lateral (regional) dialogue or agreements; the actions, statements, or behaviors of leaders related to fuel cycle issues (e.g., Japan and France’s willingness to end plutonium breeder programs); emergence of credible solution, increased credibility/uptake of certain ideas or proposed solutions (e.g., multi-national consortia, multi-national governance of fuel production, storage, and use), championing of fuel cycle reforms by influential actors]
   b. [For any signals of progress named, probe to learn: when did it occur? What contributed (probe for specifics)?]
c. Have there been/what are setbacks? [Probe for specifics]

s. [For any setback named, probe to learn: when did it occur? What contributed (probe for specifics)?]

7. To what extent do recent technological developments or research have implications for regional and global fuel cycle efforts, either positively or negatively? [_probe for specifics, e.g., new waste disposal methods, new missile technology that makes countries more likely to want to stockpile materials, cyber warfare that can destroy reactors.]

8. To what extent is public opinion a factor that could affect dialogue and progress related to fuel cycle issues? E.g., some have noted that negative public opinions about nuclear fuel could make progress easier, conversely nuclear has gained some public support as a means of combatting climate change.

9. In order to help us better understand the context and content of your work on the fuel cycle issues and/or progress that has been achieved, can you point us to any reports, briefs or other secondary sources that you think would be useful?

10. Is there anyone that you think we should connect with to better understand the influence of your work? (e.g., decision makers, etc.)
External (Non-Grantee) Stakeholders

1. Can you tell me about the role you play in the nuclear / nuclear threat reduction field?
   a. How long have you been working on these issues?
   b. What are your areas of focus?

2. Of the following issues, which 1-2 do you think are most concerning and/or demonstrate the highest level of risk or threat? Please explain.
   a. Lack of / counterproductive U.S. leadership regarding nuclear issues
   b. Current nuclear states’ level of commitment towards non-proliferation and/or disarmament [probe as to which countries’ commitments are most concerning/demonstrate the highest level of risk or threat, and whether the concern is specific to nuclear states’ commitments re: non-proliferation, disarmament, or both]
   c. Efforts by new countries to expand their nuclear capabilities [probe for which countries]
   d. Erosion of multilateral/bilateral treaties and agreements [probe for which treaties or agreements this is relevant to, how the status of treaties and agreements reflects the status of bi-lateral and multi-lateral dialogue]
   e. Is there an issue(s) besides those just mentioned that demonstrates the highest level of risk or threat?

For the 1-2 issues named as a high-level risk/threat:

3. To what extent have issue(s) changed in the past 5 years, e.g., become more/less of a risk or threat?

4. In the past five years, to what extent have compelling recommendations or solutions surfaced or been brought to bear to address the risks or threats presented by the issue(s)? Please describe.

For any compelling recommendation or solution named:

5. What individuals, constituencies, or groups do you see as the main analysts (proponents) or champions?

6. What are, if any, positive signals of recent progress in terms of addressing or advancing promising recommendations or solutions to address the highest-level nuclear risks or threats?

7. What do you see as the main obstacles for addressing or advancing recommendations or solutions? (including factors in the landscape – political, technical, etc. or opposition to policy recommendations or solutions)?

8. How likely or unlikely do you think it is that [the identified compelling advancements/recommendations/solutions] will progress in the next 5 to 10 years?
9. Over the past 5 years what have been the most compelling technology advancements that affect, either negatively or positively, nuclear threat reductions?

10. To what extent has that technology/technologies incentivized countries to develop new or more weapons, and/or affected (negatively or positively) their ability or desire to disarm, commit to peaceful use, or eliminate materials in nuclear weapons?

11. What is the role of civil society in influencing nuclear risk reduction? How has this changed over the past 5 year, if at all?

12. Amongst the civil society actors working in the nuclear space, which do you currently see as being the most influential or effective in advancing solutions that promote sound nuclear policy to reduce global nuclear risk?

13. Are you familiar with funding levels, generally, to civil society organizations working on nuclear issues?
   
   a. If yes, are there currently any unfunded or underfunded issues/topics which if resourced, could potentially lead to greater advancement of solutions?

14. Beyond funding, are philanthropic organizations able to contribute to nuclear threat reduction in other ways? If so, how?

15. Are you familiar with the MacArthur Foundation’s Nuclear Challenges program?

16. (If familiar) To what extent, if any, has the Foundations’ support in the nuclear field provided the means for traction towards advancing solutions to reduce global nuclear risk? What do you see as the main challenges, if any, for the Foundation in advancing solutions to reduce global nuclear risk?

17. Could you recommend 2-3 experts in the field that you might recommend we speak with [possible probes depending on the informant include - topic specific ie technology, or officials/former officials from key countries, or policy/advocacy specialists]
Members of Congress, Staff, and Other Officials

18. In addition to your own knowledge and that within your office, how do you gather information about nuclear issues?
   a. Probe for: other MOC staff/MOC; private briefings, read written documents or publications, attend trainings/briefings

19. Who do you engage with? [Note which grantee connected us, if relevant].
   a. Probe for: orgs viz individuals; multiple, or just a few? What drives decisions about who to engage with? Are there certain orgs/individuals whose information/insights you rely on more?

20. What’s the value of this information to you and your office / your role?
   a. [For MOC/staff] To what extent does it shape thinking / congressional dialog and debate?
   b. [For state department officials] To what extent does it inform policy development; shape options when considering bilateral/multilateral dialogue around nuclear issues?
   c. [For executive branch officials] To what extent does it inform executive officials’ actions and decisions, inform executive branch officials’ dialogue around nuclear issues?

21. How can non-government actors improve how they engage with you? Do you have any preferences for how you access information about nuclear issues?
   a. Probe for: consolidation, aligned messaging, more in-person engagement, more written analysis

22. What topics are of critical interest to you?
   a. Probe for general nuclear issues as well as specific module-related topics such as disarmament in North Korea, non-proliferation in Iran, nuclear-focused dialogue between the U.S. and Russia, the NPT, U.S. nuclear policy, aspects of the fuel cycle, etc.

23. How do nuclear issues compare to other priorities you are concerned with?
   a. Has the prominence or priority of nuclear issues changed over the last three years?
Landscape – Funders

1. What are, if any, positive signals of recent progress in terms of addressing or advancing reduction of nuclear threats?

2. What do you see as the main obstacles for addressing or advancing nuclear risk reduction? [Probe for the significance of factors in the landscape – e.g., notable political tensions between key countries, technological developments, opposition to proposed policy recommendations or solutions.]

3. What is the role of civil society in influencing nuclear risk reduction? How has this changed over the past 5 year, if at all?

4. Amongst the civil society actors working in the nuclear space, which do you currently see as being the most influential or effective in advancing solutions that promote sound nuclear policy to reduce global nuclear risk?

5. Are you familiar with funding levels, generally, to civil society organizations working on nuclear issues?
   a. If yes, are there currently any unfunded or underfunded issues/topics which if resourced, could potentially lead to greater advancement of solutions?

6. Beyond funding, are philanthropic organizations able to contribute to nuclear threat reduction in other ways? If so, how?

7. To what extent are funders of nuclear security and threat reduction aligning or connecting their work?
   a. Probe for the extent to which funders: issue joint RFPs, coordinate grantmaking, co-sponsor events, utilize common messaging, develop joint work products, or engage in other means of coordination.
   b. Probe for which funders are aligned/coordinating their work?
   c. Probe for whether there are agreements, whether formal or informal, in place to support coordination?
   d. Probe for how / to what extent do funders communicate with one another about their efforts?

8. To what extent do funders of nuclear security and threat reduction aspire to be more coordinated? If so, in what ways?

9. Are there / what are barriers to coordination? Please describe.
Landscape – Technology

1. Can you describe [your/your organization’s] focus regarding nuclear threat reduction and, specifically, regarding technology as it relates to nuclear threat reduction?

2. To what extent do the following technological developments have significant implications for the nuclear risk environment and/or nuclear threat reduction efforts, either positive or negative?
   - new missile technologies
   - artificial intelligence or other cyber developments (Stuxnet)
   - additive manufacturing, e.g., 3-D printing / other dual use tech
   - quantum computing (increased computing power for weapons targeting and missile defense
   - reactor technologies (light water, fast, pyro)
   - new waste disposal methods
   a. Are there other significant technological developments? If so, please describe.

3. [For any technologies identified as significant] Can you briefly describe the implications of these technologies for the risk environment and/or nuclear threat reduction efforts?
   a. To what extent do (might) technological advancements incentivize countries to develop new or more weapons?
   b. To what extent do (might) technological advancements affect countries’ commitments to nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use?

4. Across the nuclear security field, to what extent is there general agreement about which / how technological developments have implications for nuclear risk? Where are views divided and/or where are there notable debates?

5. To what extent, if at all, do technological developments heighten/reinforce or mitigate other factors that are relevant to the nuclear risk environment, such as regional political tensions, poor U.S.-Russia relations, fragile alliances?

6. Have we missed anything? Are there other considerations regarding technological advancements and their relationship to nuclear risk and/or threat reduction efforts that we should be attentive to?
   [For any additional considerations or tech developments that respondents propose]:
   a. Why are these significant?
   b. What are implications the risk environment and/or nuclear threat reduction efforts?

7. In order to help us better understand the relevance and potential influence of certain technologies on nuclear threat reduction efforts, can you point us to any reports, briefs or other secondary sources that you think would be useful?
Nucleus Impact Post-Training Interview

1. We want to start by asking you about the context and motivation for Nucleus Impact’s work on messaging related to reducing nuclear risk.
   a. Can you briefly describe how you first became involved in work related to reducing nuclear risk. What motivated you to become involved in this work?
   b. The workshop you led/attended was about messaging strategies to reduce nuclear risk. Why is now the right time for the nuclear field to consider new approaches and strategies related to messaging?
      i. What do you see as the major opportunities that exist for the nuclear field around messaging and communications?
      ii. What are the major challenges?

2. We want to turn now specifically to the recent workshop itself.
   a. We know that attendees at the workshop included members of the nuclear field and intersectional experts.
      i. What were your considerations in deciding who to invite to the workshop? To what extent were you able to get the “right” mix of people to attend?
      ii. What were your aspirations about who should attend the workshop? To what extent did you feel the “right” mix of people that attended?
   b. We know the workshop focused on messaging using frames likely to resonate with “generation possible.” From your perspective, what were the primary goals for the recent workshop? To what extent do you feel those goals were achieved?
      i. Probe for: Promoting interaction across sectors, increase awareness and knowledge of messaging strategies, promoting partnerships etc.
   c. Was there a “peak” or “aha” moment from the workshop that you would like to share?

3. Now that the workshop is over, how do you hope that individuals will take what they have learned and apply it in their work?
   a. How do you hope that those from the nuclear field apply learnings from the workshop? What about intersectional experts?
      i. Have you heard about specific examples of the ways that workshop attendees are taking new approaches to messaging?
   b. Is there more work that Nucleus Impact (or others) are planning that seeks to build on the momentum created at the workshop? What will that look like?
   c. Have you heard of any partnerships or collaborations coming out of the workshop?
d. Has anyone followed up with you to ask for more information or support around messaging strategies?

4. Organizations within the nuclear field take disparate approaches to communications, with some organizations seeking to target policy-makers (members of congress, executive branch, diplomats), others targeting the expert community (i.e. the NGO community, govt agencies, regulatory bodies) and other hoping reach the general public (or specific audiences within the general public).

a. What do you see as the potential for messaging that targets “generation possible” to enhance the communications work of those in the nuclear field working?
   i. To what extent are messaging strategies focused on generation possible more relevant for targeting messaging to certain groups as compared to others?
      1. Probe for examples of relevance for messaging within the expert community, among policy makers, segments of the general public
   ii. What would it take for the nuclear field to take advantage of the opportunities presented by new messaging strategies?

5. To what extent is public opinion a factor that affects policymakers/ influencers’ attitudes toward nuclear issues? If public opinion around nuclear issues were to shift, would that impact organizations'/ grantees’ ability to be effective in their congressional engagement efforts? Why/why not?

a. What are the areas where public opinion is likely to matter more? Are there areas where public opinion is less important?

b. What are the key segments of the general public that have the most potential to influence decision maker/influencer decision making and action?
Surveys

Nuclear Impact Post-Training Survey

1. Why did you decide to attend the workshop today on “New Messaging Strategies to Reduce Nuclear Threat”? [Please check all that apply]
   a. To increase my own or my organization’s level of knowledge around messaging and communications
   b. To learn about or gain access to new communications tools
   c. To identify potential collaborators or partners
   d. Other (write in)

As a result of the workshop today... [Rating from Strongly Disagree=1, 5=Strongly Agree]
   a. I increased my knowledge of how to communicate about nuclear threat to generate more interest among a new generation of changemakers
   b. I increased my knowledge of how to communicate about nuclear threat to generate more interest among policy makers
   c. I increased my knowledge of how to communicate about nuclear threat to generate more interest among those working my sector
   d. I gained access to new communication tools applicable my work
   e. I increased my understanding of how my own or my organization’s work aligns with the work of others within my sector
   f. I increased my understanding of how my own or my organization’s work aligns with the work of others working in other sectors
   g. Other (write in)

2. Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements [Rating from Strongly Disagree=1, 5=Strongly Agree]
   a. The workshop today on “New Messaging Strategies to Reduce Nuclear Threat” was a good use of my time
   b. I plan to share elements of what I learned today with other members of my organization or with my personal network
   c. I plan to apply what I learned today to support my organizations’ ongoing communications work
   d. I plan to apply what I learned today to develop a new communications campaign
e. I plan to follow up with someone I met at the meeting today to explore potential partnership or collaboration
f. Other (write in)

3. What are the primary audience(s) you or your organization seek to engage with in your communications work? (Open ended)
ReThink Media Post-Training Survey

July 2019

4. Name (Open ended)

5. Why did you decide to attend the workshop today? (Please check all that apply)
   a. To feel better prepared for the next time I engage with media (e.g., broadcast appearances, interviews, etc.)
   b. To learn how to build better relationships with media professionals
   c. To learn how to better engage with non-expert audiences
   d. To learn how to enhance the profile of my communications work

6. What is your overall review of today’s session on a scale of 1 to 10? (Please circle your rating below)

   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10

   Most Negative                                     Most Positive

7. How useful did you find the content of today’s session on a scale of 1-10? (Please circle your response below)

   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10

   Not at all useful                                      Very useful

8. How would you rate the presenter(s) of today’s session on a scale of 1 to 10? (Please circle your response below)

   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10

   Most Negative                                     Most Positive

9. What were some of your key takeaways from the training today? (Open ended)
10. Do you have any suggestions for improving the training? (Open ended)

11. Which of the following are audiences that you or your organizations seek to engage with in your communications work? (Please check all that apply)
   a. The general public
   b. The nuclear field
   c. US government officials
   d. Members of Congress and congressional staff
   e. Other (Write in)

12. What (if any) follow up resources or information would be most helpful? (Open ended)

October 2019

1. Name (Open ended)

2. Why did you decide to attend the workshop today? (Please check all that apply)
   a. To feel better prepared for the next time I engage with media (e.g., broadcast appearances, interviews, etc.)
   b. To learn how to build better relationships with media professionals
   c. To learn how to better engage with non-expert audiences
   d. To learn how to enhance the profile of my communications work

3. What is your overall review of today’s session on a scale of 1 to 10? (Please circle your rating below)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most Negative</td>
<td>Most Positive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. How would you rate the presenter(s) of today’s session on a scale of 1 to 10? (Please circle your response below)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most Negative</td>
<td>Most Positive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. How useful did you find the content of today’s session on a scale of 1-10? (Please circle your response below)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all useful</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Very useful</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. What were some of your key takeaways from the training today? (Open ended)

7. What did you find least useful? (Open ended)

8. Do you have any suggestions for improving the training? (Open ended)

9. What (if any) follow up resources or information would be most helpful? (Open ended)
Grantee Convening Feedback Survey

September 2019

Reflecting on the presentation by the Macarthur Foundation Nuclear Challenges team, please answer the following questions.

10. Would you like more information to clarify any components of the Nuclear Challenges Theory of Change? (Please check one)
   a. Yes, I would like for information
   b. No, more information would not be useful for me

   If you checked “Yes”, what specifically would you like more information about? (Please briefly describe below)

11. Would you like more information to clarify the evaluation activities related to the Nuclear Challenges program?
   a. Yes, I would like for information
   b. No, more information would not be useful for me

   If you checked “Yes”, what specifically would you like more information about? (Please briefly describe below)

12. What elements of the Nuclear Challenges Theory of Change align with your current work for which you have received Foundation funding? [Please check all that apply]
   a. Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in North Korea
   b. Nuclear non-proliferation in Iran
   c. Assessing proliferation risks among U.S. allies/ allied countries
   d. Tensions between countries that possess nuclear weapons and those that do not
   e. Relations between the United States and Russia
   f. Education and awareness on nuclear issues within the U.S. Congress
   g. Offering an alternative nuclear policy vision
   h. Nuclear fuel cycle issues in the United States
   i. Global nuclear fuel cycle issues
   j. Other (Write in)

Reflecting on your experience with today’s convening, please answer the following questions:

13. What components of convening were valuable to you and why? (Open ended)
14. What components of the convening were not valuable to you and why? (Open ended)

15. What topics would you be interested in exploring in future grantee meetings with the Nuclear Challenges team? (Open ended)

16. What advice would you give us about convening the grantee group in the future? (Open ended)

Reflecting on your communications needs, please answer the following questions:

17. The Nuclear Challenges team is considering capacity-building activities related to communications. Please indicate how helpful the following activities would be to you and your organization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Not helpful/needed</th>
<th>A little helpful</th>
<th>Very helpful</th>
<th>I’m not sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public speaking training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social media training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writing training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis communications training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message guidance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. What other areas of your communications work would benefit from training or support? (Open ended)

19. Are there others in your organization we should talk to in order to learn more about your organization’s communications needs? (Open ended)

20. What other questions, comments, or feedback do you have for the Nuclear Challenges team or ORS, the Evaluation and Learning Partner? (Open ended)
December 2019

Reflecting on the presentation by the Macarthur Foundation Nuclear Challenges team, please answer the following questions.

1. Would you like more information to clarify any components of the Nuclear Challenges Theory of Change? (Please check one)
   a. Yes, I would like for information
   b. No, more information would not be useful for me

   If you checked “Yes”, what specifically would you like more information about? (Please briefly describe below)

2. Would you like more information to clarify the evaluation activities related to the Nuclear Challenges program?
   a. Yes, I would like for information
   b. No, more information would not be useful for me

   If you checked “Yes”, what specifically would you like more information about? (Please briefly describe below)

3. What elements of the Nuclear Challenges Theory of Change align with your current work for which you have received Foundation funding? [Please check all that apply]
   a. Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in North Korea
   b. Nuclear non-proliferation in Iran
   c. Assessing proliferation risks among U.S. allies/ allied countries
   d. Tensions between countries that possess nuclear weapons and those that do not
   e. Relations between the United States and Russia
   f. Education and awareness on nuclear issues within the U.S. Congress
   g. Offering an alternative nuclear policy vision
   h. Nuclear fuel cycle issues in the United States
   i. Global nuclear fuel cycle issues
   j. Other (Write in)

Reflecting on your experience with today’s webinar, please answer the following questions:

4. What components of the webinar were valuable to you and why? (Open ended)

5. What components of the webinar were not valuable to you and why? (Open-ended)
6. What topics would you be interested in exploring in future grantee meetings with the Nuclear Challenges team?

7. What advice would you give us about convening the grantee group in the future? (Open ended)

8. What other questions, comments, or feedback do you have for the Nuclear Challenges team or ORS, the Evaluation and Learning Partner? (Open ended)

Reflecting on your communications needs, please answer the following questions:

9. The Nuclear Challenges team is considering capacity-building activities related to communications. Please indicate how helpful the following activities would be the top priorities for your organization? (Please select your top two)
   a. Media training
   b. Public speaking training
   c. Social media training
   d. Writing training
   e. Crisis communications training
   f. Message guidance

10. What other areas of your communications work would benefit from training or support? (Open ended)

11. Are there others in your organization we should talk to in order to learn more about your organization’s communications needs? (Open ended)
All-Grantee Survey

Part 1, for flexible support/X-grant/surge grant/gen ops grant recipients

Introduction

One way in which the Foundation directs its support is towards the development and expansion of civil society organizations’ base or breadth of knowledge and skills and their capacity to be flexible and responsive. This type of support has been delivered through general operating grants and flexible support grants, as well as small grant awards (under $50,000) to eligible organizations for a range of activities, including but not limited to: travel, meetings, conference attendance, small research projects, support for writing op-eds, public opinion polling, scenario building exercises, media assistance, outreach help, and assistance with messaging and branding.

You are being asked to respond to the following questions because you/your organization received a general operating grant, flexible support grant, and/or a small grant award. This part of the survey should take no more than 10 mins to complete.

Questions

1. The grant(s) supported my organization’s capacity to pivot or respond to: [Scaled response: 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Somewhat disagree, 4 = Somewhat agree, 5 = Agree, 6 = Strongly Agree; NA = Not applicable/not relevant]
   a. A critical event (such as a missile launch, withdrawal from an important agreement)
   b. Changing circumstances (such as increasingly hostile rhetoric between leaders in North Korea and the United States, i.e. “fire and fury” statements)
   c. An unexpected opportunity window (a scheduled nuclear policy summit between two leaders)

2. Please describe how the grant(s) supported your organization’s capacity to engage in core work, pivot, or respond at critical times. [Scaled response: 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Somewhat disagree, 4 = Somewhat agree, 5 = Agree, 6 = Strongly Agree; NA = Not relevant to scope]

   The grant enabled my organization to:
   a. **Analyze and disseminate timely research and/or recommendations** in response to a critical event, opportunity window, or changing circumstances.
   b. **Equip government officials with timely, useful analysis and recommendations**, e.g., quickly provide analysis or recommendations to officials when most needed or when requested.
c. **Deepen relationships** with governmental officials, leaders, or decisionmakers, e.g., via meetings or working sessions.

d. **Expand or deepen existing partnerships, relationships, or collaborations** with others working on nuclear risk reduction.

e. **Pursue new partnerships, relationships, or collaborations** within the nuclear field to address nuclear risk/nuclear issues.

f. **Pursue new partnerships, relationships, or collaborations** with people outside of the nuclear field e.g. climate, cyber security, media to address nuclear risk/nuclear issues.

g. **Create or disseminate timely communications or statements**, e.g., blogs, op-eds, website content, briefs, to help officials or others understand or respond to a critical event, opportunity window, or changing circumstances.

h. **Reach audiences** beyond the individuals/groups that the organization normally targets or addresses through its work.

i. The grant affected my organization’s capacity in **some other way(s)**.
   i. [Please describe (Open ended):]

3. Please share who or what your work, aided by the Nuclear Challenges grant(s), influenced and in **what ways**, e.g., Did certain people or groups become more aware of nuclear risk, and/or take action? Did your recommendations to policymakers gain traction or momentum? Were you able to help civil society organizations build additional skills? [Open-ended]

4. Besides grant(s), are there other ways that the MacArthur Foundation could support or **strengthen your organization’s capacity** to effectively respond to critical events, opportunity windows, or changing circumstances? [Y/N]
   a. [Please describe: (Open ended)]

**Part 2, for U.S. Weapons Policy module grantees**

**Introduction**

You are being asked to respond to the following questions because you/your organization received a grant to support your work related to improving U.S. nuclear policy in accordance with the principles of nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses. This part of the survey should take no more than 10-15 mins to complete.

**Questions**
1. To what extent have you had the opportunity to influence any of the following with your research / analysis / advocacy? [Scaled response: 1 = No opportunity to influence this group; 3 = Moderate opportunity...; 4= to 5 = Significant opportunity...; N/A]
   a. Members of Congress
   b. Executive Office of the President
   c. Departments and Agencies (DOD, State, DOE)
   d. U.S. Diplomatic community
   e. Civilian leaders in other fields (e.g. science, tech, and media)
   f. Other [please describe]

2. Over the past 5 years, to what extent has engagement on nuclear issues among U.S. leadership increased or decreased within the following categories? [Scaled response: 1=Significant reduction in engagement; 3=No change; 5=Significant increase; Unsure]
   a. Members of Congress
   b. Executive Office of the President
   c. Departments and Agencies (DOD, State, DOE)
   d. U.S. diplomatic community
   e. Civilian leaders in other fields (e.g. science, tech, and media)
   f. Other [please describe]

3. A. Over the past 5 years, to what extent has U.S. leadership in relation to a commitment to nonproliferation improved or deteriorated within the following categories? [Scaled response: 1=Leadership has deteriorated, 3=No change in leadership, 5=Leadership has improved; Unsure]
   a. Members of Congress
   b. Executive Office of the President
   c. Departments and Agencies (DOD, State, DOE)
   d. U.S. diplomatic community
   e. Civilian leaders in other fields (e.g. science, tech, and media)
   f. Other [please describe]

B. Over the past 5 years, to what extent has U.S. leadership in relation to a commitment to disarmament improved or deteriorated within the following categories? [Scaled response: 1=Leadership has deteriorated, 3=No change in leadership, 5=Leadership has improved; Unsure]
   a. Members of Congress
   b. Executive Office of the President
c. Departments and Agencies (DOD, State, DOE)  

d. U.S. diplomatic community  

e. Civilian leaders in other fields (e.g. science, tech, and media)  

f. Other [please describe]  

C. Over the past 5 years, to what extent has U.S. leadership in relation to a commitment to peaceful uses of nuclear technology improved or deteriorated within the following categories? [Scaled response: 1=Leadership has deteriorated, 3=No change in leadership, 5=Leadership has improved; Unsure]  

g. Members of Congress  
h. Executive Office of the President  
i. Departments and Agencies (DOD, State, DOE)  
j. U.S. diplomatic community  
k. Civilian leaders in other fields (e.g. science, tech, and media)  
l. Other [please describe]  

4. What are 2-3 examples of policies that reflect a U.S. commitment to nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear technology, and have current traction among U.S. experts and/or U.S. officials? [Open-ended]  

5. To what extent do you agree with this statement: “Challenging deterrence theory is a worthwhile policy and advocacy pursuit. [Scaled response: 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Somewhat disagree, 4 = Somewhat agree, 5 = Agree, 6 = Strongly Agree]  

6. To what extent is your MacArthur-funded work focused on challenging deterrence theory? [Scaled response: 1 = Work is not at all focused on this topic to 5 = nearly all my work is focused on this topic; NA/Not relevant to scope]  

*Conditional question for those who answered 4 or 5 on the scale:*  

6a. If your work is focused on challenging deterrence theory, what activities have you pursued to engage stakeholders on this topic? [Check all that apply]  

i. Published research and analysis  

ii. Convened experts for dialogue and exchange of ideas  

iii. Advocated with civilian stakeholders  

iv. Advocated / engaged with U.S.-based officials  

v. Advocated / engaged with Democratic candidates  

vi. Other (please describe): [open-ended]
Part 3, for all Nuclear Challenges grantees with open grants

Introduction

You are being asked to respond to the following questions because you/your organization received a grant from the MacArthur Foundation’s Nuclear Challenges program. We seek your feedback about statements related to nuclear policy and nuclear issues that are represented in the Nuclear Challenges Theory of Change. The questions should take no more than 10 mins to complete.

The statements below reflect elements of the Nuclear Challenges Theory of Change related to the stability and strength of nuclear cooperation and risk reduction; all of these factors or conditions may change over time in response to the efforts of civil society organizations as well as changes or occurrences in the landscape. For each statement below, please indicate:

a. The extent to which it is currently true. [Scaled response 1 = this statement is not true at all, 3=this statement somewhat true, 5 = this statement is very true; Unsure]

b. The extent to which it is likely to be true five years from now. [Scaled response 1 = this statement is very unlikely to be true five years from now, 3=this statement might be true five years from now, 5 = this statement is very likely to be true five years from now; Unsure]

Additionally, please feel free to share comments to help explain any of your answers.

Questions

Statements:

- The U.S. and Russia are continuing their commitments to non-proliferation. Comments: [Open ended]
- The U.S. and Russia are continuing their commitments to disarmament. Comments: [Open ended]
- There are significantly influential members of Congress who are championing nuclear solutions and demonstrating commitment to regime principles (non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use). Comments: [Open ended]
- U.S. policymakers agree with/accept that the United States should completely end use and eliminate stockpiles of weapons-useable material. Comments: [Open ended]
- U.S. leadership and influence within the nuclear regime is evident and aligns with the regime principles. Comments: [Open ended]
- A significant number of U.S. leaders believe it is necessary to challenge the deterrence-centric status quo of United States’ nuclear policy. Comments: [Open ended]
- Credible and viable ideas have emerged that challenge nuclear deterrence theory. Comments: [Open ended]
• Iran is maintaining its commitment to non-proliferation. Comments: [Open ended]
• North Korea is not producing additional weapons-useable material. Comments: [Open ended]
• North Korea is committed to disarmament. Comments: [Open ended]
• There is productive dialogue on nuclear weapons policy between the United States and its allies that have the capability to develop weapons. Comments: [Open ended]
• U.S. allies that have the capability to develop weapons are not taking steps to produce or acquire weapons. Comments: [Open ended]
• U.S. allies that have the capability to develop weapons are maintaining or enhancing their commitment to peaceful use of nuclear technology. Comments: [Open ended]
• U.S. allies that have the capability to develop weapons are ceasing/not beginning production of weapons-useable material. Comments: [Open ended]
• U.S. allies that have the capability to develop weapons are beginning the process of eliminating weapons-useable material stockpiles. Comments: [Open ended]
• P5 countries are maintaining or strengthening commitments to disarmament and non-proliferation. Comments: [Open ended]
• Non-nuclear possessor countries are maintaining or strengthening commitments to non-proliferation. Comments: [Open ended]
• Non-nuclear possessor countries refrain from seeking nuclear weapons of their own
• Domestic policies, or bilateral/multilateral agreements or treaties that adhere to core regime principles (non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use) are being advanced. Comments: [Open ended]
• A multi-lateral agreement that assures ceased production and elimination of weapons-useable material is likely to be adopted. Comments: [Open ended]
• Non-possessors refrain from seeking nuclear weapons of their own. Comments: [Open ended]
• The number of nuclear weapons, globally, is not significantly increasing. Comments: [Open ended]
• Existing treaties, agreements, norms, or other protocols that advance or support nonproliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons, and peaceful use of nuclear technology are not eroding. Comments: [Open ended]

3. What are the 1-2 most critical issues that are contributing to nuclear risk? [Open ended]

4. What are, if any, areas of recent progress in terms of addressing or advancing promising recommendations or solutions to reduce nuclear risk? [Open ended]